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The opinion of the court was delivered by
GRAVES, C. J.-The defendant hired the plaintiff's horse to
drive from Milford to Holley and back and the animal became sick
and died. The plaintiff claimed that this was caused by defendant's
ill-usage and neglect and he sued for damages. The jury found judgment against him and he brought this writ of error. Only two rulings are complained, of and both were made in admitting evidence.
The defendant proved that he left Milford soon after nine o'clock in
the morning to go to Holley, some fifteen miles away, in company
with Clark Crawford,'and stopped at Buckthorn to give the horse
water. He offered to show a conversation which occurred at that
place between himself and Crawford about the appearance and condition of the horse at that time ; the object being to establish that
he acted considerately and exercised due care and prudence. The
plaintiff's counsel objected, but the court overruled the objection
and we think rightly. What occurred at that time between Crawford and defendant in reference to the state and condition of the
horse was pertinent and proper. It bore upon the questions
whether the defendant was rash, heedless and indifferent, or awake,
watchful and circumspect; and how he stood and acted in tF.is
respect, was involved in the case alleged against him. If he felt
and acted as he ought, he was not liable.
The defendant gave evidence that oix two former occasions the
horse when driven by other persons fell sick of colic, and adduced'
other testimony to raise an inference that the horse's death was
owing to the same difficulty. The plaintiff produced a witness who
swore that he was a veterinary surgeon of twenty-five years stand-
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ing, and his opinion as an expert being called for he swore that in
his opinion the horse died from being overfed when too hot, which
would produce colic. On cross-examination he said that colic was
caused by over driving and feeding when the animal is too warm ;
that all works of good authority spoke of it and that the " Modern
Horse Doctor, by Dr. Dodd," was a work of that kind. The tiefendant then offered to show from this work of Dr. Dodd, where
the author treats of colic, the passage following: "In nine cases
out of ten colic is the result of impaired digestive organs; the food
runs into fermentation and evolves carbonic acid gas." This evidence was offered to discredit this expert in connection with his
cross-examination. The plaintiff objected to its introduction but
the court admitted it. The rule is acknowledged in this state that
medical books are not admissible as a substantive medium of proof
of the facts they set forth. But the matter in question was not
adduced with any such view. The witness assumed to be a person
versed in veterinary science; to be familiar with the best books
which treat of it, and among others with the work of Dodd. lie
professed himself qualified to give an opinion to the jury from the
witness stand on the ailment of the plaintiff's horse and its cause,
and the drift of his opinion was to connect the defendant with that
ailment. He borrowed credit for the accuracy of his statement on
referring his learning to the books before mentioned and by implying that he echoed the standard authorities like Dodd. Under the
circumstances it was not improper to resort to the book, not to prove
the facts it contained, but to disprove the statement of the witness
and enable the jury to see that the book did not contain what he
had ascribed to it. The final purpose was to disparage the opinion
of the witness and hinder the jury from being imposed upon by a
false light. The case is a clear exception to the rule which forbids
the reading of books of inductive science as affirmative evidence
of the facts treated of. B2ipon v. Bittell, 30 Wis. 614 ; 2 Whart.
on Ev., § 666.
We think the court committed no error and that the judgment
should be affirmed with costs.
When may books of art or science be
read in evidence to a court or jury for
the purpose of proving the opinions of
the writers as contained therein ? This
question will be answered in this note.
VoL. XXXI.-14

As to books of exact science, there seems
to be no question upon their admissibility. In such works, as has been well
said, conclusions from certain and constant data are reached by processes too
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intricate to be elucidated by a witness on
the stand, and hence such evidence is the
best that, on the subject, can be had.
In Wager v. Schuyler, I Wend. 553,
decided in New York in 1828, the
question was as to the value of the
interest of the tenant in dower of certain land. The Northampton Tables
were introduced and received by the
.'court to show the probable duration of
life of the plaintiff. Again, in Sahell v.
Plumb, 55 N. Y. 598 (1874), an action
was brought on a contract to support the
plaintiff during her life. To estimate
the probabla duration of her life, the
Northamptoi Tables were received in
evidence. On appeal, this course was
"They were competent,"
approved.
said GaovER, J., "in connection with
the proof given as to the health, constitution and habits of the plaintiff." In
Mills v. Catlin, 22 Vt. 98 (1849), it
was held by the Supreme Court of Vermont, that where the plaintiff proved an
outstanding life estate, as a breach of
the covenant of seisin, and gave evidence as to the age and general health
of the tenant for life, and the annual
value of the premises, it was not error
for the court to allow Dr. Wigglesworth's Tables for estimating life to be
used by the jury in estimating damages.
In Donaldson v. Missouri, &-c., Railroad
Co., 18 Iowa 291 (1865), the Carlisle
Tables were admitted for the purpose of
showing the expectation of human life.
This action was against a railroad company to recover damages for the death
of the plaintiff's intestate. And see
Baltimore, 4-c., Railroad Co. v. State,
33 Aid. 542 (1870); David v.. Railroad, 41 Ga. 223 (1870); Williams's
Case, 3 Bland Chanc. 221; Rowley v.
Railroad, L. R., 8 Ex. 226. And so
tables showing the rise and fill of the
tide, at certain places and times, have
been admitted: Green v. Cornwell, 1
City Hall Rec. 11 (1816).
It I is, however, likewise ruled that
though mortuary tables are admissible,

they will not be allowed to control
where their rules work manifest inThus, in a recent case in
justice.
Pennsylvania (Shippen's Appeal, 2
Weekly Notes Cases 468), a husband
and wife had executed a mortgage of
the wife's land for the sum of $12,000.
Of this sum the husband appropriated
for his own use $4221, and afterwards
made an assignment for the benefit of
After his wife's death
his creditors.
the land was sold under the mortgage,
after paying which there remained
$12,000, which was claimed both by
a devisee of the wife, and the husband's
assignees. It was held by the Supreme
Court that the value of the husband's
estate, by the curtesy, was to be computed at one-third of the fee, and not
according to the Carlisle Tables. "As
to the measure of the life estate," said
the court, "we say that the Carlisle
They
Tables are not authoritative.
answer well their proper purpose to
ascertain the average duration of life,
so as to protect life insurers against
ultimate loss upon a large number of
policies, and thereby to make a profit to
But an individual
the shareholders.
case depends on its own circumstances,
and the relative rights of the life tenant
and remainderman are to be ascertained accordingly.' A consumptive or
diseased man does not stand on the
same plane as one of the same age in
vigorous health. Their expectations of
life differ in point of fact. A court,
therefore, must ascertain the actual
probable expectations of life of the party
as he is, or must adopt some recognised
standard as its legal
approximate
measure, in order to capitalize the
interest he is entitled to for life. In
this case the Carlisle Tables, it is said,
would give the value of the life estate or
capitalized interest, at $6534.60, leaving the fee simple estate worth but
$5202.
This disproportion is quite
manifest. We are, therefore, disposed
to take the old common-law rule of one-
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third of the whole sum as the present
value of the accumulated interest for the
life of (the husband). This gives a
sum of several hundred dollars less than
that received by him out of his wife's
mortage money."
Passing now to treatises on questions
not within the domain of exact science,
we find more difficult problems presenting themselves. "For several reasons," says Mr. Wharton, " treatises
on such of the inductive sciences as are
based on data which each successive
year corrects and expands, must be
refused admission when offertd to prove
the truth of facts contained in such treatises. In the first place a sound induction last year, is not necessarily a sound
induction this year; and as a matter of
fact, works of this class, when they do
not become obsolete, are altered in material features from edition to edition, so
that we cannot tell, in citing even from
a living author, whether what we read
is not something that this very author
now rejects. In the second place, if
such books are admitted as a class, those
which are compilations must be admitted
as well as those which contain the results of original research ; the purely
speculative must come in side by side
with the empirical, so that if such treatises are admitted at all, it will be impossible to exclude those which are seeondary evidence of the facts-they state.
In the third place such books, without
expert testimony, cannot generally be
pointed to the concrete case ; with expert
testimony they become simply part of
such testimony, and lose their independent substantive character as books. In
the fourth place the authors of such
books do not write under oath, and
hence write often tentatively; nor are
they examined under oath, and hence
the authorities on which they rest cannot be explored, nor their processes of
reasoning tested. Lastly, such works
ore at the best hearsay proof of that
which living witnesses could be produced

to prove. Books of this class, therefore,
though admissible, if properly authenti
cated, to prove tie state of science at a
particular epoch, are inadmissible as ihdependent substantive evidence to prove
the facts theyset forth-" Whart on Ev.,
sect. 665.
The earliest ease in which a ruling is
to be found excluding this species of
evidence is Collier v. Shapson, 5 0. & P.
73, which was held at Nisi Prius, before
Chief Justice TINDAL, in 1831. The
action was one for slander, in charging the
plaintiff, a physician, with malpractice in
prescribing improper medicines for a
child. The plaintiff proposed to show
that his prescriptions were proper, and the
doses not too large, and offered to put in
evidence medical books of authority to
show wlat was the received opinion on
the subject in tile medical profession.
But the chief justice refused to receive
the books in evidence, saying that physic
depended so much on practice, but allowed the plaintiff to call as a witness a
celebrated physician, Sir Henry Halford,
who testified that lie considered the medicine proper, and that it was sanctioned
by the medical profession. The witness
also testified that the writings of Dr.
Merriman and Sir Astley Cooper were
considered authorities in the medical pro-

fession.

TiNDAL.,

C. J., said :

"

I do

not think that the books themselves
can be read; but I do not see any objection to your asking Sir Henry Halford his judgment, and the grounds of
it, which may be in some degree founded
on books, as a part of his general
knowledge."
In Massachusetts tile same rule has
been adhered to. Ashworth v. Kittridge,
12 Cush. 193, decided in 1853, was an
action against a surgeon for malpractice; and on the trial, the plaintiff's
counsel had been permitted against the
defendant's objection, to read a number
of medical books to the jury. In the
Supreme Judicial Court this was held to
be error. "It was," said Chief Justice
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SHAW,

"formerly

practised rather by

general indulgence and tacit consent of
parties than in pursuance of any rule of
law; but it has been frequently decided
that it is not admissible, and we now consider the law to this effect well settled,
both upon principle and authority.
Where books are thus offered they are in
effect used as evidence, and the substantial objection is that they are statements
wanting the sanction of an oath ; and
the statement thus proposed is made by
one not presept and not liable to crossexamination. If the same author were
cross-examined, and called to state the
grounds of his opinion, he might himself alter or modify it, and it would be
tested by a comparison with the opinions
of others. MKedical authors, like writers
in other departments of seience, have their
various and conflicting theories, and often
sustain and defend them with ingenuity.
But as the whole range of medical literature is not open to persons of common experience, a passage may be found in one
book favorable to a particular opinion,
when perhaps the same opinion may have
been vigorously contested, and perhaps
triumphantly overthrown, by other medical authors, but authors whose works
would not be likely to be known to counsel or client or to court or jury. Besides, medical science has its own nomenclature, its technical terms and words
of art, and also common words used in
a peculiar mannler, distinct from their
received meaning in tie geneial use of
the language. From these and other
causes a person not versed in medical
literature, though having a good knowedge of the general use of the English
language, would be in danger,without an
interpreter, of misapprehending the true
meaning of the author. Whereas amedical witness would not only give the fact
of his opinion and the grounds on which
it is formed, with the sanction of his oath,
but would also state and explain it, in
language intelligible to men of common
experience. If it be said that no books

should be read except works of good and
established authority, the difficulty at
once arises as to the question what constitutes 'good authority,' more especially whether it is a question of competency to be decided by the court, wlether
any particular book shall be received or
rejected, or a question of weight of testimony, so that any book may be read,
leaving its weight, force and effect to the
jury. Either of the alternatives would
be attended with obvious if not insuperable objections." The next case in this
state arose a year later. In Conmonwealth v. Wilson, 1 Gray 338 (1854),
the prisoner was indicted for murder,
and his counsel in opening his case proposed to read to the jury definitions of
insanity from law books and also statistics on the subject from the same sources.
But SHAW, C. J., refused. "Facts or
opinions," said lie, "on the subject of
insanity, as on any other subject, cannot
be laid before the jury, except by the
testimony under oath of persons skilled
in such matters. Whether stated in the
language of the court, or of the counsel
in a former case, or cited from the works
of legal or medical writers, they are stilt
statements of fact and *must be proved
on oath. The opinion of a lawyer on
such a question of fact is entitled to no
more weight than that of any other person not an expert. The principles governing the admissibility of such evidence
have been fully considered by this court
since the trial of Rogers, and the more
recent English authorities are against
the admission of such evidence." In
Washburn v. Cuddihy, 8 Gray 430, decided in the same state in 1857, an action was brought for a breach of a warranty on a sale of a horse, the breach
consisting in the horse being a "cribber."
On the trial, the defendant's
counsel contended that "cribbing" was
notan unsoundness in a horse but amere
habit; and was proceeding to support
his argument by reading from Dr. Dodd's
Veterinary Surgeon, when he was stop-
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ped by the court.

The ruling was af-

firmed on appeal, TnoxAs,

J.,

saying:

"In refusing to allow the counsel to
read from works of medical or veterinary practice to the jury, the presiding
judge conformed to the now well-settled
practice in this Commonwealth," citing
the earlier cases of Ashworth v.Kittridqe,
and Commonwealth v. JVilson. In Whiton v. Albany,'4c., Insurance Co., 109
Mass. 24, decided in 1871, a policy of
marine insurance prohibited the vessel
from- visiting "guano islands." The
ship had stopped at the island of Navassa, in the Caribbean sea, and the
question was whether this island was
called and known in commerce, trade,
navigation, and the business of marine
insurance as a "guano island." The
defendant's counsel desired to read from
Appleton's American Cyclopwedia, an
article on the subject of guano on the
islands of the Caribbean sea; but were
not permitted by the trial judge to do so.
On appeal the ruling was approved.
Says GnAY, J. : "A book published in
this country by a private person is not
competent evidence of facts stated therein of recent occurrence, and which
might be proved by living witnesses or
other better evidence ; and the book in
question not being shown to have been
approved by any public authority, or to
be in general use among merchanfs or
underwriters, bad no tendency to show
that the island of Navassa was commonly
called and known as a guano island."
In The Commonwealth v. Sturtivant, 117
Mass. 130 decided in the same state in
1875, the indictment was for murder,
and it became important for the prosecution to show that certain blood stains
were from human blood. An expert
having testified on behalf of the prisoner
that it was impossible to determine with
certainty, in the case of a stain that had
been dry upon clothing seven days,
whether it was human blood, was asked
if lie concurred with the views expressed
in Taylor's Medical Jurisprudence. The

counsel then proposed that a certain
paragraph upon that point from the book
with which the witness concurred in
opinion, should be read to the jury; but
the court refused to allow it to be done.
In the Supreme Court the ruling was
approved, saying: "1The refusal to allow a witness to read extracts from a
work on medical jurisprudence was in
accordance with the well-settled practice
in this Commonwealth."
In Bowler v. Lewis, 25 Tex. 380
(1860), an action being brought for the
price of a horse sold by the plaintiff to
the defendant, the latter set up a false
and fraudulent warranty in alleging
that the animal was sound when he was
A treatise
affected with the "curb."
on horses by Youatt, acknowledged to
be a work of high authority, was offered
to prove the nature of the disease known
as the "curb," but was not permitted by
the court to be read in evidence. In
larrisv. PanamaRailroad Co., 3 Bosw.
7 (1858), a carrier being sued for the
value of a horse injured while in transportation by rail, set up the defence that
Youatt on
the horse was diseased.
Horses was again offered as an authority
on the question, and again rejected.
"The matters alleged in such a book as
facts," said BoswOnTi, J., "when
relevant to an issme to be tried, must be
proved in the same manner as any other
facts. The book itself is no evidence of
their truth." In Melvin v. Easby, I
Jones (N. C.) 387 (1854), the question
was also as to the unsoundness of a horse,
and the trial judge permitted counsel to
read to the jury extracts from a book on
the diseases of horses. On appeal this
was held to be error, the court saying :
"The rule is that professional books or
books of science (e. g. medical books) are
not admissible in evidence. * * * The

reason of the rule is obvious, that if the
authors were present, they could not be
examined without being sworn, and exposed to a cross-examination. Their declarations or statements, whether merely
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verbal, Written or printed and publisbed in books, are not admissible."
And the same rule has been followed in
Indiana: Carter v. State, 2 Ind. 617
(1851).

In Rhode Island, in State v.

O'Brien, 7 R. I. 336 (1862), a murder
case, the court refused to permit Taylor's
MIedical Jprisprudence to be read to the
jury. "The book offered to be read to
w
the jury," said BuATOx, X., "i as not
admissible as evidence. No evidence in
the nature of parol testimony could properly pass to them except under the
sanction of an oath; and upon this
ground books of science are excluded,
notwithstanding the opinion of scientific
men that they are books of authority and
valuable as treatises. Scientific men
are admitted to give their opinions as
experts, because given under oath; but
the books which they write containing
them are, for want of such oath, excluded."
It is clear, however, that the opinions
contained in books may go to the jury
through the mouth of a witness-an
expert. Chief Justice TINDAL, in Jo!lier v. Simpson, while ruling against the
admissibility of the books themselves,
thought it proper to permit the scientific
witnesses 'to express, under oath, their
opinions in the questions involved,
though these opinions were based in
some measure on books and not on
This rule has been
actual practice.
adopted in many subsequent cases' in
this country. Thus, in Carter v. State,
2 Ind. 617, decided in Indiana in 1851,
the prisoner being indicted for murder
by poisoning, medical witnesses were
permitted to testify as to the effect of
poison on the system, from information
derived from the writings of standard
writers on the subject.
But the question most debated has
been this one: may counsel, in addressing the jury, read to them approved
scientific works as a part of their argument ? Here we shall find a great difference of opinion, some courts holding

in the affirmative, others in the negatie,
and others again taking the middle
ground, that the practice is one allowable
under certain circumstances to be decided by the trial court in its discretion.
As has been well said, an able and diligent advocate could scarcely sum up a
case of any magnitude, without repeating either from memory or from books,
the principles hearing on the controversy,
as laid down by the best authors. And
where authorities are cited it is much
better, in order to avoid mistake, that
the books should be produced to speak
for themselves, than that the matters
stated in them should be taken from the
mouth of the speaker: Graham and Wat
New Trials 685. Instances of counsel
in their speeches to the jury, reading
from text books and treatises, are to be
found outside of the repovts. For cases
read to the
in -which Lord EasKIwn
jury, see Erskine's Speeches, vol. 1,
pp. 75, 301, 423, 461, 501, 589.
For American precedents, see Moore's
American Eloquence, vol. 1, pp. 235,
Thomas
342, 538, vol. 2, p. 242.
Addis Emmett, in the case of Goodwin,
indicted for manslaughter; John Adams
and Josiah Quincy, in their defence of
the British soldiers; Samuel Dexter and
Daniel Webster in numerous cases exercised this right ; and such has been the
practice of such distinguished lawyers' as
S. S. Prentiss, Rufus Choate, James T.
Brady, David P. Brown and Henry
Clay. See People v. Anderson, 44 Cal.
65. Nevertheless, the judicial authority
as contained in the reports is not at all
harmonious.
It is held in England and in some of
the American states, that in suming up
their case to the jury, counsel are entitled to read from approved scientific
works as a part of their argument. In
Reg. v. Courvoisier, 9 C. & P. 362,
tried before TINDAL, C. J., in 1840, the
prisoner was indicted for the murder of
Lord William Russell. The counsel for
the prosecution, in his address to the jury,
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alluded to the subject of circumstantial
evidence, and was proceeding to read the
observations of Chief Baron MACDoxALD in Patch's Case, on the' nature and
effect of circumstantial evidence, when
he was interrupted by the prisoner's
counsel, who objected to the book being
read. But t,:e chief justice held the
proceeding proper, saying: "He has a
right to use them as his own opinions.
There is no objection to his adopting
them as part of his own speech." In
State v. Hoyt, 46 Conm. 330 (1878), decided in Connecticut in 1878, the indictment was for murder; the defence insanity. As a part of the argument for
the defence, the prisoner's counsel asked
permission to read to the jury some
abstracts from "Ray's Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity."
The trial judge
refiused to allow the reading. On appeal
this ruling was reversed. "The plea of
insanity," said PARDEE, J., "interposed on behalf of persons intoxicated,
is supported by the testimony of persons
who, by study of books and nhen, have
entitled themselves to speak as experts
in that science. By way of vindication
of their right to be heard as instructors
of the jury, they usually preface their
testimony by a statement of the extent
at' their experience. in the treatment of
persons afflicted with disease of the
mind, and the time given to the reading
of treatises upon insanity written by men
of wide experience and acknowledged
ability in the treatment of such diseases ;
their opinion is the result of observation
of men, and reading of books. And in
this jurisdiction for a long series of years
counsel have been permitted to read to
the jury, as a part of their argument,
upon this part of their case, extracts
from such treatises as, by the testimony
of experts, have been accepted by the
profession as authority upon that subject;
such treatises as have helped to form the
opinion expressed by the expert. The
practice by repetition has hardened into
a rule ; a rule, upon the continued ex-

istence of which, counsel for the accused
in the case before us bad a right to rely;
the abrogation of which, by the ruling
complained of, may have been a surprise.
The question is not, shall such reading
be now for the first time permitted ; it
is, shall it now for the first time be forbidden without notice? We think that
privileges hitherto granted to persons in
like circumstances with the accused,
should not be denied to him, to his posTwo judges consible prejudice."
curred in this opinion. Loomris, J.
(PARK, C. J., concurring with him), dissented.
So in Iowa, Indiana, Alabama and
some other states, the admission of such
evidence is approved.
Bowman v.
Woeds, I G. Greene 441, decided in
1848, was an action against a botanic
physician for malpractice. On the trial
the defendant offered to introduce certain medical books, which witnesses
had testified to being standard works on
botanic medicine, but the court excluded them. On appeal this was held
to be error. "The authorities on this
point," said GREExE, J., "are not
uniform; but the district judge decided
in conformity to the prevailing decisions
of at least the English courts (citing
Collier v. Simpson). Judge ABOT, on
the trial of fDonal for poisoning, refused
to appeal to the works of Thdnard, and
said: 'We cannot take the fact from any
publication ; we cannot take the fact as
related by ny stranger' (Gay's Forensic Medicine 11). And Dr. Beck, in
his excellent work on Medical Jurisprudence, states that in this country an
objection has never been 'made to the
introduction of authority, or the observation of others, as testimony by medical
men. In this we think the author mistaken, for an appeal to medical authorities has been disallowed by some of the
courts in this country ; though physicians, when testifying, ire permitted to
refer to medical authors, and to quote
their opinions from memory. Being
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permitted to refer to and quote authors,
we can see no good reason why they may
not read the views and opinions of distinguished authors. The opinions of an
author, as contained in his works, we
regard as better evidence than the mere
statement of those opinions by a witness,
who testifies as to his recollection of
them from former reading. Is not the
latter secondary to the former. On the
whole we think it the safest rule to
admit standard medical books as evidence of the author's opinions upon
questions of medical skill or practice
involved in a trial. This rule appears
to us the most accordant with wellestablished principles of evidence."
Subsequently a statute was passed making books of art and science competent
evidence in this state. Rev. Stat. sect.
3995 of owa, provides: "fl/istorical
works, books of science or art, and
published maps or charts, when made
by persons indifferent between the par.
ties, are presumptive evidence of facts
of general notoriety or interest." See
Broadhead v. Wiltse, 35 Iowa 429
(1872). In Cory v. Silcox, 6 Ind. 39
(1854), decided in Indiana in 1854, the
plaintiff in a suit for backing water by a
dam, and injuring I is mill, read, in his
closing argument to the jury, extracts
from "Evans's Millwright Guide." The
court afterwards charged the jury on
the subject in these words: "Extracts
read from a scientific work are not of
authority conclusively or prima facie.
Like argument of counsel, or any other
thing adduced to illustrate, they may be
satisfactory to the jury or they maynot."
On appeal this was approved. " Rleason." said the Supreme Court, "is
neither more nor less than reason, because it happens to be read from a book ;
an(!, we think we would be adopting a
very difficult rule to enforce if we
should attempt to compel counsel to use
their own arguments for every position
they might assume." In Alabama such
evidence has been held admissible:

Soudenmeter v. Rqlliamson, 29 Ala. 558
(1857) ; Herde v. State, 37 Id. 139
(1861).
In the first case the book admitted was, "Acton on Venereal Diseases."
In the second, " The U. S.
Dispensary."
In a capital case in Georgia, it *as held not erroneous for the
prisoner's counsel in the argument to
read from Wills on Circumstantial Evidence, and on the other for the slate's
attorney to ridicule the work as mere
fiction and romance: Jones v. State, 65
Ga. 506 (1880) ; and in Georgia and
Massachusetts counsel have been permitted to read from law books in addressing the jury: Powell v. State, 65
Ga. 709 (1880) ;
Commonwealth v.
Porter, 10 Mete. 284 (1845) ; Commonwealth v. Abbott, 13 Id. 123 (1847).
The treatise which the counsel reads
from must be a standard one. Therefore the proper practice is for the expert
to be called to prove the authority of the
book in the first instance: State v.
Hoyt, 46 Conn. 330 (1878).
The courts of other states in which
the subject has arisen, are either against
this practice or else leave the matter to
the discretion of the trial court. In
Luning v. State, 1 Chand. 178 (1849),
decided in Wisconsin in 1849, the trial
was on an indictment for a nuisance in
keeping a mill dam and so obstructing a
stream as to overflow the land at certain
places to the injury of the health of the
inhabitants. Counsel proposed on the
trial to read to the jury certain standard
medical works as to the effect of malaria.
The court refused permission. On appeal tht Supreme Court refused to reverse the judgment on this ground.
"This," said LARRABEE, J., "is a'matter generally within the discretion of the
court ; and therefore not the subject of a
writ of error. In many cases, no doubt,
it would be proper to allow books of
science to be read, though generally such
a practice would lead to evil results.
But certainly counsel have no right to
read indiscriminately what books they
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may choose, as is contended by the coun- tion of questions, both of law and of
sel for the plaintiff in error. The lati- fact, yet inasmuch as this privilege may
tude to be given to counsel in argument be liable to abuse, to the great hindrance
is always under the control and in the and annoyance of courts, in the progress
discretion of the court." In Texas, the of business, the extent and manner of
privilege of counsel, in addressing the its exercise must in some measure rest
jury, to read from legal authorities or in the sound discretion of the court.
works of general science, extracts perti- Although unlimited license in range and
nent to the case, in support of their ar- extent is not allowed to counsel in tleir
gument, is held discretionary with the addresses to the court and jury, yet no
court. Said Wunrzxt, J., "It is a pertinent and legitimate process of arguvaluable privilege. * ** Yet this privi- mentation within the appropriate time
leze is so susceptible of abuse that the allowed, should be restricted or prohibextent and manner of its exercise must ited. And it is not to be denied but that
be intrusted, in a great measure, to the a pertinent quotation or extract from a
sound discretion of the court. It is more work on science or art, as well as from a
reasonable to suppose the court will not classical, historical or other publication,
abridge it improperly, than that the ad- may, by way of argument or illustravocate, actuated by the strong desire for tion, be not only admissible, but somesuccess and triumph over his adversary, times higldy proper. And it would seem
will not abuse it." The action bad been to make no difference whether it was repeated by counsel from recollection or
brought for the breach of warranty of
soundness of a slave. The question was read from a book. It would be an abuse
whether the slave bad died of heart dis- of this privilege, however, to make it
case, and the defendant's counsel in his the pretence of getting improper matter
address to the jury was preparing to read before the jury as evidence in the cause."
from and comment upon a work entitled And the rule of discretion seems to be
"Hope on the Heart," but was pre- adopted in California. In People v.
vented by the trial judge: Wade v. De- Anderson, 44 Cal. 65 (1872), it was
ll'tt, 20 Tex. 398 (1857). In Ohio, a said : c" As a general rule, the practice
similar opinion has been expressed. of allowing counsel, in either a civil or
criminal action, to read law to the jury
In Legge v. Drake, 1 Ohio St. 287,
decided in that state in 1853, the de- is objectionable, and ought not to be
fendant's counsel, during his argument tolerated- Its usual effect is to confuse
to the jury, desired to read from Youatt rather than to enlighten the jury. There
on Veterinary Surgery, but the plain- are cases, however, in which it is pertiff's objection was sustained. On ap- missible for counsel, by way of illustration, to read to the jury reported cases
peal the Supreme Court said: "The
question presented is not whether stand- or extracts from text books, subject to
ard books on matters of .science and the sound discretion of the court, whose
art, when pertinent, can be proven, and duty it is to check promptly any effort on
given in evidence on the trial of the the part of counsel to induce the jury to
cause, but whether counsel, in their ad- disregard the instructions or to take the
dress to the jury, have a right by way of law of the case from the books rather
argument or illustration to read extracts than from the court." But in Califorfrom works on science not given in evi- nia, in a very recent case, People v.
dence. 'While the right of a party to be Wheeler, 8 Pac. C. L. J. 581 (1882),
heard by his counsel on the trial of his the rule excluding the reading of sciencause is not to be questioned, and is tific treatises to the jury has been foloften of great service in the investiga- lowed. This was a criminal case, in
VOL. XXXI.-5
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wbich the district attorney on the argument had been permitted to read to'the
jury certain extracts from "Brown on
No evidence had been adInsanity."
duced that the book was a standard
authority, and on this ground the decision of the Supreme Court was placed.
But from the language used by the judge
who delivered the opinion, it would appear that had this evidence been forthcoming, it would still have been error
in the court below to have allowed the
book to be read to the jury. "The expert" said the Supreme Court "is called
to assist the jury in reaching a just conelusion; his testimony is necessarily subject to the supervision of the jury.
They must determine not only whether
the hypothetical case on which his opinion is based is the case before them as
established by credible testimony, but
must consider the reasons lie has given
for his opinions, and by his whole testimony test his credibility and the correctness of his judgment. Inasmuch as the
circumstances on which the jury are to
aetermine the weight to be given the
opinion of an expert are more numerous
and complicated than those by reference
to which they are to decide on the consideration t6 be afforded to the statements of a witness with respect to facts
and influences involved, if any, which
are within the reach of those possessed
of no special or scientific acquirements,
it follows that it is peculiarly important
that a defendant charged with clime
should be confronted by the expert witnesses against him, and tlint they should
be cross-examined in his presence. But
where the opinions of a writer as to the
presence or absence of insanity upon
facts more or less analogous to those
claimed by the prosecution or defence to
be established in the case, are permitted
to go to the jury, the writer is not sworn
or cross-examined at all. Such evidence
is equally objectionable whether introduced by the people or by the defendant.
If held admissible the question of insan-

ity may be tried not by the testimony,
but upon excerpts from works presenting
partial views of variant and perhaps
contradictory theories. In the case before us, too, there was no evidence that the
work from which the district attorney read
various sections, was a standard authority in the medical profession, or that the
author was an expert."
Ordway v. Hughes, 50 N. H. 159
(1870), a New Hampshire ise, indicates
that such a practice is not permitted at all
in this state. This was an action against
a surgeon for malpractice, 'by which in
setting a fractured bone, the lower portion of the fractured bone was pushed up
and lapped by the upper portion, thereby
causing a shortening of the limb. In
opening the case to the jury the plaintiff's counsel offered to exhibit to them
an engraving in a medical book, as a
chalk, to exhibit his meaning. This the
court refused to allow. On appeal the
ruling was sustained, the Supreme Court
holding that although a chalk or engraving might properly be exhibited to the
jury as an illustration, yet it was not
proper to exhibit it as taken from a
medical book, for this would give it an
undue importance in the minds of the
jury. Said SARGENT, J., "The engraving that was offered as a chalk
taken alone was not objectionable. The
witness may use, to illustrate his meaning, and the counsel to illustrate his
case, any chalk, whether engraved or
more roughly sketched, whether made
with a pen, a pencil, a paint brush, a
coal or a piece of chalk. If the diagram
alone were offered, and offered simply as
a chalk, we see no objection to it. But
when it was offered, as the case shows
this was, ' as an engraving in a medical
book,' that makes it at once irproper as
evidence, because that gives it an undue
importance with the jury. The jury
should not know that it was in a medical
book, or a law book, or what the book
was that contained it. In fact if it was
to go to the jury as a chalk, it should
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not be in any book, for that simple fact
might lead the jury to attach an undue
importance to it. If the jury are to be
told that the engraving shown them is
taken from a medical book or was got
up by some distinguished doctor or man
of science, it might give it a weight,
an authority with the jury, which no
mere chalk was designed to have or
would have. This is a matter which
must be left to the discretion of the
court. An engraving may be as good a
chalk as anything, but it should not be
attached to or contained in any book,
nor should the jury be told from what
book it was taken, or that it ever was in
any book, asd nothing should be said
about it only that it is to be used as a
sketch or chalk to illustrate the case.
Where it is offered as a part of a medical
book or as the work of some distinguished man, then the presiding judge
should exclude it, is he did in this case
very properly. But when separated
from everything else and offered by the
counsel or a witness simply as a chalk,
with nothing said as to whence it came
from or who made it, then we see no objection to it on the ground that it was
engraved or painted, unless there was
something about it that the court could
see was calculated to mislead the jury.
We think this matter must and ought to
be left to the presiding justice to decide,
as one of the matters in his discretion.
In this case we see no reason why the
discretion was not properly exercised."
In Illinois
the question has hardly been
squarely decided. Yoe v. The People,
49 Il1. 411, was a murder case which
was tried in 1868. The prosecuting
attorney was permitted against the objections qf the prisoner to read to the
jury copious extracts from medical
works, which had not been introduced
in evidence, and which bad not been
proved to be authorities, and to state to
time jury that what lie had read was
authority upon the subject of poisoning
by arsenic. The Supreme Court held

this to be improper, but added: "If
the state's attorney in such a case, or in
any case, read from medical books in his
argument to the jury, the court should
instruct them that such books are not
evidence but theories simply of medical
men."
In Gale v. Rector, 5 Bradw.
481 (1879), decided in one of the appellate courts in 1879. the question was
whether a surgeon had treated the defendant's wife in a proper manner.
Upon this question, the defendant's
counsel was permitted to read an extract to the jury from Gross on Surgery.
This was held to be erroneous.
A leading English case on this subject
deserves in this place a review of some
length. There it was held that counsel
in addressing the jury are allowed to
read from or refer to printed books for
the purpose of showing the opinions of
authors or others on particular subjects.
But they cannot do so for the purpose
of proving facts: Derby v. Ousely, I H.
& N. 12 (1856).
The action was for a
libel contained in an article entitled " A
Papal Rebel in Her Majesty's Service."
In his address to the jury the defendant's
counsel proposed, in order to show the
doctrine of the church of Rome with
respect to heretics, to read certain
canons and decrees of that church, viz. :
those of the Councils of Lateran, Aries,
Sens and Trent ; also a paragraph from
a book published by a Roman Catholic
priest in 1822, entitled, "Development
of the Church of Rome in Ireland ;"
also to read from histories the excommunication by the Popes of various heretical sovereigns; also to read the bull
"In
Cona Domini,"
read every
Maundy Thursday at Rome by the
Pope;
also the oath of a Roman
Catholic Bishop, from the Pontificale
Romanum, and some of the notes to the
Testament published by the Catholic
College of Rheims in 1852. The court
refused to allow him to read any of
these documents, being of opinion that
if they were of authority in Catholic
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countries, they ought to be proved as

that he might refer to particular writers

foreign law. In moving for a new trial,
the counsel said: "1These documents
were not intended to be referred-to as
evidence, but only as illustrating the
doctrines by which the plaintiff acknowledged himself bound.
The works of
Hume, Paley, Bolingbroke, Bacon,
&e., are frequently cited as illustrating
certain themes. On the trial of O'Connell in Ireland, in 1843, his counsel
read to the jury extracts from newspapers published in 1831, containing
accounts of political meetings at Birmingham, &c., and also speeches in Par'
liament. 4 But POLLOCK, C. B., replied:
"In
Rex v. Hone, which was tried
before Lord ELLnonouGn, the defendant cited numerous authors for the
purpose of showing that parodies, instead of being a contempt of the thing
parodied, were a tribute to its merit.
He showed that Luther had parodied
the Lord's Prayer, and Addison the
Creed.
Standard authors may b6 referred to for such a purpose, or as showing the opinions of eminent men on particular subjects, but not to prove facts."
On further consideration, all the judges
thought the ruling correct. " No doubt
under certain circumstances," said the
Chief Baron for the whole court, "1as in
Hone's Case, counsel and defendants
have been permitted to refer very largely
to printed works. If a question arose as
to composition for the purpose of showing that a particular expression was not
in reproach, but laudatory ; or that certain words were not used in an ironical
sense; works in prose and verse may be
referred to. 'On the trial of Mr. O'Connell very large quotations were made
from books and speeches ; so also, in an
information against John and Leigh
Hunt, for a seditious libel, Lord
BROUGHAm quoted several books not
in evidence ; but when on a subsequent
occasion he proposed to read books for
the purpose of proving facts, Lord ELEWRxnOouon interrupted him, saying,

upon general subjects, but that he could
not bring forward their statements to
prove facts. It could never be supposed
that books might be referred to for the
purpose of proving the best mode of conducting agriculture. If a landlord complained of a farmer for not properly cultivating his land, he could not refer to
books in order to show in what way the
land ought to be cultivated, for that must
be proved before the jury, who are sworn
to try secundum allegata et probata. So
in an action on a warranty of a horse,
it would not be allowable to refer to
works of a veterinary surgeon, in order
to show what is unsoundness. In this
case, the defendant's counsel proposed to
read certain specific canons, not as matters of speculative opinion, but as
Canons of the Church of Rome, promulgated by authority and sanctioned by the
Pope in council. These are matters of
fact, and if of any authority, ought to
have been proved. The learned counsel
was opening a case for the defendant
which consisted merely of observations
on facts already proved ; for lie had announced his intention not to call witnesses, and, therefore, could not afterwards be allowed to do so.
Then be
proposed to read from various histories,
the excommunication by the Popes of
heretical sovereigns, and also to read
the bull 'In Cmna Domini.'
The
learned judge very properly ruled that
he might refer generally to the fact that
Popes have excommunicated sovereigns,
but that he had no right to read the terms
of a specific bull, as that was a matter to
-be proved. It is the same with respect to
the Pontificale Romanum, and the notes
to the Rheims Testament. In short, the
defendant's counsel wanted to prove certai facts ; he opened them as facts, and
supposed that because he could find them
in certain documents and books, lie was
relieved from the necessity of calling
witnesses to prove them, thereby avoiding
a reply."
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But there is one purpose for which, this exception, and its conclusion is fortiaccording to the principal case, books of fled by the earlier case of the City of
science may be read in evidence, viz. : to, Ripon v. Bittel (30 Wis. 619), decided
contradict a witness who has testified in Wisconsin in 1872.
Jonx D. LAWSON.
concerning statements alleged by him
St. Louis, Mo.
to be contained in the book. The leading case of Pinney v. Call, lays down

Supreme Court of illinois.
CHICAGO, BURLINGTON AND QUINCY RAILROAD COMPANY v.
JOHNSON, ADsIxRISTRATRIX.
Negligence is the opposite of care and prudence-the omission to use the means
reasonably necessary to avoid injury to others.
To maintain an action for negligence, there must be fault on the part of the defendant, and no want of ordinary care on the part of the plaintiff.
In their legal sense the words "1ordinary negligence mean the want of ordinary
diligence, and are to be distinguished from the words "slight negligence," which
mean the want of great diligence, The doctrine of comparative negligence applies
only to cases of slight negligence, and it is therefore error to instruct the jury that
plaintiff though guilty of ordinary negligence may yet recover if his negligence was
slight in comparison with defendant's gross negligence.
The speed of a railway train is a subject upon which any one is entitled to express
an opinion, the jury being presumably able to estimate such opinion for what it is
worth.
ERROR to Kendall county.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ScHOLFIELD, J.-The declaration contains two counts. In the
first, the allegation is general that the defendant negligently drove
and managed its locomotive, etc. In the second, the negligence
alleged is in driving its engine, etc., at a rate of speed prohibited
by an ordinance of the town of Plano.
At the time he received the fatal injury, plaintiff's intestate was
in the employ of a firm engaged in the manufacture of the Marsh
Harvester, at the shops of the company of that name at Plano.
For the convenience of those in charge of these shops, a switch
had been laid on the grounds of the Marsh Harvester Company,
connecting with defendant's main track, which was used by those in
charge of the shops for unloading materials shipped to the shops
and for loading machines to be shipped from the shops. In one of
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the buildings used for shops, was a saw room, the door of which
opened towards this switch, and within ten or twelve feet of it. It
was the duty of plaintiff's intestate, in conjunction with several
others, to take lumber out of the saw room by that door and across
the track to another part of the grounds of the Harvester Company.
While thus occupied, and as he was passing over this switch with a
load of lumber on his shoulder, one of the defendant's trains, which
was being backed along the side track, struck and instantly killed
him.
The evidence tended to show that the defendant did the switching for the shops twice a day, at fixed regular hours, which were
generally known to the employees in and about the shops; that the
deceased had been engaged in the performance of the duties that
lie then was performing, for several months; that others saw the
approaching train and gave him warning; and that by looking in
the proper direction the train could have been observed in time to
have avoided the injury. As to the weight of this evidence, it is
not our province to express any opinion. It is sufficient to state
there was evidence of this tendency before thejury. There was also a
conflict in the evidence as to the rate of speed at which the train was
moving, some evidence tending to show that it was less than that
allowed by the ordinance of the town of Plano, and some tending
to show that it was greater, Among other- instructions given by_
the court at the instance of the plaintiff, were the following:
1. The jury are instructed that the fact that a municipal corporation by ordinance prohibits the running of engines, locomotives
and railway trains at a certain rate of speed, as for example, six
miles an hour through its corporate territory, does not warrant or
license the running of such trains at such rate of speed. It is the duty
of those having the management and control of such engines, locomotives and trains to conform the rate of speed to the safety of the
public at all places where such a rate of speed would probably
cause the death of individuals, or endanger their personal safety.
If, therefore, the jury believes from all the evidence in this cause,
that the defendant at the time, and on the said side track where
said Johnson was killed (if the proof shows that Johnson was killed
on the side track in question) was running its said train of cars and
locomotivd at a rate of speed dangerous to the personal safety of
those whose right and privilege it was to cross the said side track,
and that by reason of such dangerous rate of speed of said loco-
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motive, engine and cars, plaintiff's intestate, while in the exercise
of reasonable prudence and care, was struck, run over and killed
by said defendant, the verdict should be for plaintiff, and the jury
should so find. But if the jury believe from the evidence that
Johnson did not exercise ordinary care, yet that Johnson's negligence was slight, and that the negligence of the defendant was
gross in comparison with each other, then the plaintiff must recover, and the verdict must be for the plaintiff.
2. The court instructs the jury that railroad companies in cities
and thoroughfares where there are many persons frequently passing over their tracks, are under legal obligations to regard the
safety of such persons, and must conduct their trains and regulate
their speed with reference to the safety of the public at such places
or be liable fbr damages resulting from such negligence or wilfulness. If, therefore, the jury believe from all the evidence in this
cause, that the said Christian L. Johnson was killed 'by said defendant, its agent or employees, without negligence on his part, by reason
of the rapid and unlawful running of one of its trains, as in plaintiff's declaration charged, the verdict should be for the plaintiff.
But, if from all the evidence it should appear that Johnson was
not exercising ordinary care, yet the plaintiff may recover,
if Johnson's negligence was slight, and that of defendant was
gross in comparison with each other, and the verdict must be for
plaintiff.
3. The jury are instructed that if they believe from all the evidence in this cause that at the time of the alleged killing of the
said Christian L. Johnson, the said killing took place at and within
the corporate limits of the town of Plano, in the county of Kendall
and state of Illinois, and that at said time there was in force a valid
ordinance in said incorporated town, prohibiting the running in the
corporate limits of said town, at a greater rate of speed than six
miles per hour, locomotives, engines and freight trains, and if the
jury further believe from all the evidence in this cause, that at
said time and place, the defendant was running one of its engines
with cars attached, at a greater rate of speed than was permitted
by said ordinance, an~d that by reason of such unlawful rate of
speed, if such speed is shown by the proof, the said Johnson, without fault or negligence on his part, was killed, the verdict of the
jury should be for the plaintiff, but if from all the evidence in this
cause it appears the plaintiff's intestate, Johnson, was not exercis-
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ing ordinary care, yet the plaintiff may recover, provided the jury
believe that Johnson's negligence was slight, and the negligence
of the defendant gross in comparison with each other, then the verdict must be for plaintiff.
The doctrine has been announced, and often, reiterated in this
court, that in order to authorize the plaintiff to recover on the
ground of the mere negligence, as distinguished from the wilful
tort of the defendant, it must appear that the party injured exercised ordinary care, such as a reasonably prudent person will always
adopt for the security of his person or property, to avoid the injury
complained of. In the Jacob's Case, 20 Ills. 488, where the doctrine of comparative negligence was first announced, one of the
rulings is: " To maintain an action for negligence, there must be
fault on the part of the defendant, and no want of ordinary care
on the part of the plaintiff." And so it was ruled in C., B. & Q.
Railroad Co. v. Hfazzard, 26 Ill. 375; C., B. & Q. Railroad Co.
v. D-ewey, Adm'r, Id. 255; I1. Central Railroad Co. v. Simmons,
88 Id. 242; Chicago and Alton Railroad Co. v. Gretzner, 46 Id.
76; C. & N. W. Railroad Co. v. Sweeney, 52 Id. 325; 0., B.
Q. Railroad Co. v. Damerellet al., 81 Id. 450 ; C., B. J' Q. Railroad Co. v. Lee, 68 Id. 580. In the case last cited, it 'was said,
after stating the rule of comparative negligence: "It is an essential element to the right of action in all cases, the plaintiff or party
injured must himself exercise ordinary care, such as a reasonably
prudent person, will always adopt for the security of his person or
property. There are, and there can be no degrees of gross negligence. The cases all go to the length of holding where a party
has been injured for the want of ordinary care, no action will lie
unless the injury is wilfully inflicted. See also, St. L., A. T.
H. Railroad Co. v. Manly, 58 Ill. 300.
These instructions, it is to be borne in mind, relate to the law
of negligence, which according to the generally approved definition
of AL )ERSoN, B., in Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works Co., 11
Exch. 784, "is the omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided upon those ordinary considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs would dq, or doing something
which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. See Railroad
Co. v. Jones, 95 U. S. (5 Otto) 439, or, according to the more terse
definition of this court in C. WV. Railroad Co. v. -Haworth et al.,
39 Ills. 853: " The opposite of care and prudence; the omission
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to use the means reasonably necessary to avoid injury to others."
When there is a particular intention to injure or a degree of wilful and wanton recklessness which authorizes the presumption of
an intention to injure generally, the act ceases to be merely negligent, and becomes one of violence or fraud.
"In negligence, there is no purpoie to do a wrongful act or to
omit -the performance of a duty :" Gardner v. Heartt, 3 Denio
236-7. "Negligence, even when gross, is but an omission of duty.
It is not designed and intentional mischief, although it may be
cogent evidence of such an act :" Tonawanda Railroad Co. v.
Munger, 5 Denio 267. See also Wharton on Neg., sects 1, 2 and
8. In holding the plaintiff may recover in an action for negligence,
notwithstanding he has been guilty of contributive negligence,
where his negligence is but slight and that of the defendant gross
in comparison with each other, it must of course be understood the
terms "slight negligence" and "gross negligence" are used in
their legal sense as defined by common-law judges and text writers,
for otherwise the terms would convey no idea of a definite legal
rule as defined by those judges and writers. These terms express
the extremes of negligence.
Beyond gross or less than slight, there is no degree of negligence. " Gross gross," "grosser gross," and "grossest gross,"
and "slight slight," "slighter slight," and "slightest slight,': are
absurd, and in a legal sense impossible terms. What is less than
slight negligence the law takes cognisance of, as a ground of action,
and beyond gross negligence, the law, while recognising there may
be liability for a trespass because of a particular intention to do
wrong, or of a degree of wilful and wanton recklessness, which
authorizes the presumption of a general intention to do wrong,
recognises no degree of negligence. The definition of gross negligence itself proves that it is not intended to be the subject of
comparison. It is "the want of slight diligencb." Slight negligence is "the want of great diligence, and intermediate there is
ordinary negligence which is defined to be the want of ordinary
diligence ": Story on Bail., sect. 17, Shear. & Red. on Neg. (2d
ed.) sects. 16,17; Cooley on Torts 631 ; C., I. & T. Railroad Co.
v. Rockafellow, 17 Ills. 541. In applying the measure of slight and
gross negligence to the acts of the respective parties charged to
have been negligent, it is, of course, always to be held in remembrance that the term "negligence" is, itself relative, and its
VOL. XXXI.-16

122

CHICAGO, BUR. & G. RAILROAD CO. v. JOINSON.

application depends on the situation of the parties and the degree
of care nd vigilance which the circumstances reasonably impose:
Cooley on Torts 680. The question therefore, in the present
instance, related to the measure of care under the circumstances
shown by the evidence to have existed, imposed upon the respective
parties. It was to that mea'sure of care that these instructions
related; and if they had related to any other they would fon that
cause alone have been erroneous. The word "diligence" as used in
the definitions of the degrees of 'negligence to which we have
This is shown by the text
referred is synonymous with "care."
in Story, immediately following the definition quoted. It is there
said: "For he who is only less diligent than very careful men, can
not be said to be more than slightly inattentive; he who omits
ordinary care, is alittle more negligent than men ordinarily are; and
he who'omits even slight diligence fails in the lowest degree of prudence and'is deemed grossly negligent." It can not, then, legally
be true that where the plaintiff fails to exercise ordinary care, and
the defendant is guilty of negligence only, that the plaintiff's negligence is slight, and 'that of the defendant gross in comparison with
each other. We have seen the measure is to be applied with
reference to the rights, duties and obligations of the respective par-'
ties, Under the peculiar circumstances in evidence. Whether, therefore, the plaintiff has failed to exercise ordinary care, is to be
determined (and there can be no presumption under these instructions otherwise), with reference to his rights, duties and obligations,
and the rights, duties and obligations of the defendant, under the
peculiar circumstanCes here in evidence. Being trs determined
that he has failed to exercise ordinary care, the legal conclusion is
he is guilty of ordinary negligence. The utmost degree of negligence merely (and it is of this only, and not of trespasses or
other wrongs that'the instructions speak), of which the defendant
can be guilty, is gtoss negligence.
'The plaintiff's negligence, then, by the very terms employed
is ordinary, and that of the defendant gross in comparison with
each other. The language employed, in effect, says, although as
to this particular act, the plaintiff was guilty of ordinary negligence,
and the defendant guilty of gross negligence, still if the jury.
believe the plaintiff's negligence was slight, that is, that it was not
what the very terms employed admits it to have been, and that of
the defendant gross,'in comparison with each other, they will find
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the defendant guilty, etc. Surely it needs no demonstration that
if as to a particular act the negligence of the plaintiff was ordinary
and that of the defendant gross, their relation is not changed by
comparing them with each other. The same evidence that determines the one is gross and the other ordinary fixes their relative
degrees with reference to each other.
It seems to be thought what is said in Stratton v. Street City
Horse 1ailway Go., 95 Ill. 25, in criticising certain instructions
there given, sustains the rulingbelow in regard to these instructions.
This is a misapprehension. In those instructions it was said a
failure to exercise ordinary care was gross negligence ; and in one
it-was said no action would lie if the plaintiff failed to exercise
ordinary care unless the defendant wilfully inflicted the injury.
We have before herein shown both these positions to be inaccurate.
The failure to exercise ordinary care is only ordinary negligence;
and although a plaintiff might not exercise ordinary care, yet the
defendant would be liable for injuring him, if his act causing injury was so wilfully and wantonly reckless as to authorize the
presumption of an intention to injure personally, notwithstanding
he might have had no special intention to injure the plaintiff.
These instructions are clearly erroneous in the respect pointed
out, and might necessarily have misled the jury as to the doctrine
of comparative negligence. There is in them moreover a manifest
attempt to connect discordant propositions, which always tends to
confusion. Attempts to blend separate and distinct legal propositions in the same sentence or paragraph usually causes error in
that it tends to confuse and mislead, and should be avoided.
The objegtion taken to the admission of evidence with regard to
the speed of the train, is not tenable. This is clearly a subject
upon which any one is entitle to express an opinion, the jury being
presumably able to estimate it for what it was worth. Nor can we
say that the evidence of the property of the family of the deceased
did any harm, although it was, technically, erroneous to admit it.
In a future trial this error can and should be avoided.
For the error in giving the 1st, 2d and 3d of the plaintiff's instructions, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
Separate opinion by
J.-I concur in the judgment rendered in this case.
While the evidence tends to charge the defendant with palpable
DIOKEY,
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negligence, still, in my judgment, there is no evidence tending to
show gross negligence on the part of defendant, and the turning
question in the case in fact seems to be, whether the plaintiff's intestate used ordinary care. In such a case I think it error to submit
to the jury the rule of law as to comparative negligence. On this
ground the judgment ought to be reversed.
There is, however, a line of thought in the opinion prepared by
Mr. Justice SCHOLKELD, which I think a departure from the law
as laid down by this court ever since the decision of the Jacobs
Case, in 20 Ill. 488.
I do not think that the terms'" slight negligence," and "gross
negligence," as used in the opinion delivered in the Jacobs Case,
and in the long series of cases which have followed that case, were
used in the sense of the definitions quoted from Story, in his treatise on bailments. That author, in the same work, says: "There are
infinite shades of care or diligence, from the slightest momentary
thought, to the most vigilant anxiety. There may be a high degree
of diligence, a common degree of diligence, and slight degree of
diligence." He defines "ordinary diligence" as "that degree of
diligence which men in general exert in respect to their own concerns." He defines "extraordinary diligence" as " that which
very prudent persons take of their own concerns." And he says
"slight diligence" is "that which persons of any prudence at all
take of their own concerns." All this is readily understood-is
in harmony with the common meaning of the words used; but when
he says, in sect. 17, that "ordinary negligence " may be defined to
be "the want of ordinary diligence," and "slight negligence "to be
"the want of great diligence," and "grbss negligerfee" to be
"the want of slight diligence," he surely does not give to these
phrases the meaning in which they are used in a common or popular sense, or the meaning in which they have generally been used
by this court in the 7acobs ,ase, and other kindred cases; nor
does he give the meaning which would naturally be adopted by a
jury in giving effect to an instruction given by the court. Giving
the words their popular sense, it would rather seem that ordinary
negligence would be such negligence as men of common prudence
indulge in, which betokens only the exercise of ordinary care, and not
the want of ordinary care, as is suggested. This, where the law
requires only ordinary care, is not negligence at all, for in law negligence is always faulty. It is the failure in some degree to use
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that care which the law requires under the circumstances. In a
case where the law demands only the use or ordinary care, and
ordinary care is actually exercised, there is in law no negligence
whatever. In such case it is not true that the want of great diligence is in law slight negligence. In the popular sense of the words,
slight negligence is a slight want of the care which the circumstances
demand. A man obviously, therefore, may in such case fail slightly
to use ordinary care, and in the. popular sense of the words he
would be guilty of slight negligence, and only slight negligence,
and this, although he did not do all that ordinary care required.
And so of "gross negligence." Its popular meaning is a very great
failure to use the care which the law requires. It is not essential
to gross negligence that there shall be an utter want of care, or,
in the language of Story, "the want of" even "slight diligence."
The exercise of slight diligence, where the highest degree of care
'is by law required, may still leave the party guilty of gross negligence-that is, guilty of a very great failure to exercise the highest care.
Nor do I concur in the dicta which say there are and can be no
degrees in gross negligence, and no degrees in slight negligence.
The adjectives "slight," and "gross," seem to me to be capable
of comparison, as most adjectives are. I see no absurdity in saying

"

gross,"

"

more gross,"

"

most gross," or " gross"

"

grosser,"

"grossest," or "slight," "more slight," "slightest."
In fact, in
the quotation supra, from Story, he speaks of "infinite shades of
care," from the "slightest" momentary thought to the "most vigilant solicitude." In fact, the imperfection of these definitions of
Story leads Cooley, in his work on Torts, page 630, to say of this
classification, that it " only indicates that under the special circumstances great care or caution was required, or only ordinary care,
or only slight care ;" and to add, "if the care demanded was not
exercised, the case is one of negligence." The terms," slight negligence," or "moderate negligence," or "gross negligence," do not
indicate offences of a different, nature, but different degrees in
offences of the same nature.
I tliink, therefore, there may be cases in which it may be legally
true that the plaintiff has failed in some degree to exercise ordinary
care, and that in the same case the defendant has been guilty of
gross negligence wherein the plaintiff's negligence may be slightthat is,may consist of a slight failure to use ordinary care-and
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that of the defendant gross in comparison therewith.

To my mind

the proposition that a plaintiff's negligence is slight, is irot incom-

patible with the proposition that he has failed in some degree to use
ordinary diligence.
I pursue this discussion no further here, for the reason that in
my judgment the propriety of adopting in this connection Mr.
Story's definitions, is a question which does not come in judgment
in this case.
Perhaps the best definition of negligence that has come to the writer's
notice, is that of Judge Cootxy in his
work on Torts (p. 630), where he defines
negligence in a legal sense to be no more
nor less than "the failure to observe, for
the protection of the interests of another
person, that degree of care, precaution
and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other per'o the same effect
son suffers injury."
are the words of WILLES. J., in Grill v.
General Iron Screw Colliery Co., L. R.,
1 C. P. 612, who said: "Confusion has
arisen from regarding negligence as a
positive instead of a negative word. It
is really the absence of such care as it
was the duty of the defendant to use."
Negligence is usually divided into
three degrees-slight, ordinary and gross
Ever since the decision of
negligence.
the leading case of Coggs v. Bernard, 2
Ld. Raym. 909, in which Lord HOLT
defined these different degrees, these
terms have been used by the majority of
judges and text writers as a eonveiiient
mode of describing the degree of responsibility for the failure to observe that
degree of care which constitutes negliSee Story on Bailments, sect.
gence.
17; Shear. & Red. on Neg., sects. 16,
17, and cases there cited; Giblin v.
McMullen, L. R., 2 P. C. 317, 336, per
Lord CHELms'raon; 11offatt v. Bateman, 3 Id. 115.
1 The propriety of this classification has,
however, been questioned in a number
of modern cases and by several learned
text writers. Thus in Wilson v. Brett,

11

M. & W. 113, Baron RoL'E re.
marked that lie " could see no difference
between negligence and gross negligence;
that it was the same thing with the adIn
dition of a vituperative epithet."
Hunter v.. Dibbin, 2 Q. B. 646, 661,
also, Lord DEx-iAv, C. J., said: "It
may well be doubted whether, between
gross negligence and negligence merely,
See
any intelligible distinction exists."
also, Grill v. General 1ron Screw Colliery Co., L. R., I C. P. 600, '612 ;
Austin v. Manchester, 6-c., Railway Co.,
10 C. B. 474 ; Beal v. S. Devon Railroad Co., 3 11. & C. 337; Perkins v. N.
Y. Cent. Railroad Co., 24 N. Y. 206;
W1ells v. . Y. Cent. Railroad Co., Id.
181 ; Smith v. IV. Y. Cent. Railroad Co.,
Id. 241 ; Steamboat New World v. King,
16 How. 474; Brygsv. Taylor, 28 Vt.
185; Milwaukee, 6-c., Railroad Co. v.
Arms, 91. U. S. 494 ; Cassv. Boston 4L. Railroad Co., 14 Allen 448; Gill v.
Middleton, 105 31ass. 479; Lane v.
Boston 6- A. Railroad Co., 112 Mass.
455 ; Evans on Agency *237, 238 ;
Cooley on Torts 630. With reference
to this subject the learned author last
cited says : " Some writers classify negligence as gross negligence, ordinary
negligence and slight negligence; but
this classification only indicates this:
that under the special circumstances
great care and caution were required, or
only ordinary care, or only slight care.
If the care demanded was not exercised,
the case is one of negligence, and a legal
liability is made out where the failure is
'Mr. Evans also says (*237):
shown."
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" The expression (gross negligence) has
no fixed and certain meaning as an accurate test' of liability, and it would be
well if it were abolished." Again, on
page *238, he says : "The confusion
would he entirely got rid of, if we said
that every agent is liable for a breach of
duty, and considered the liability of the
agent by reference to his duties, and the
amount of care, diligence and skill reFrom these
quired of him by law."
authorities it will be seen that there is a
growing tendency to discard the division
of negligence into three degrees as above
stated ; and indeed it seems, to say the
ltast, to be an inaccurate use of language to transfer to the term negligence,
those epithets which only have force
when applied to the degree of care requisite under the particular circumstances of the case.
As respects the doctrine of contributory
negligence, the general rule of the common law is, that "one whose negligence
concurs with that of the other party, or
contributes to the injury complained of,
cannot recover. Both being guilty of
negligence, they are the common authors
of what immediately flowed from it, and
it was not a consequence of the negligence of either. The court cannot accurately, and will not undertake to,
discriminate between them as to the
extent of the negligence of each, and
the share of the result produced by each.
Neither, therefore, can allege against the
other any wrong, and without a wrong
there can be no legal injury :'?Moak's
Underhill on Torts 280. "In a court
of common law the plaintiff has no
remedy if his negligence, that is, if h's
want of ordinary care, in any degree,
contributed to the injury. Where,
therefore, the catastrophe was the result
of the mutual and concurring negligence
of the plaintiff and defendant, the plaintiff cannot recover damages ; for ' the
law has no scales to determine in such
cases, whose wrong-doing weighed most
in the compound that occasioned the
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The reason why, in cases
mischief.'
of mutual concurring negligence, neither
party can maintain an action against the
other, is not that the wrong of the one is
set off against the wrong of the other ; it
is that the law cannot measure how
much the damage suffered is attributable
to the plaintiff's own fault. If he were
allowed to recover, it might be that lie
would obtain from the other party compensation for his own misconduct. It is
obvious, then, that it can make no difference against whom his fault was primarily committed. If lie has suffered in
consequence of his own fault, the law
gives him no remedy:' " 2 Thomp. on
Neg. 1146. In addition to the authorities .
above quoted, see Shearm. & Rcdf. on
N g., sect. 25 ; Cooley on Torts 672,
674; Whart. on Neg., sect. 300, and
cases cited.
Although the rule above stated seems
founded upon common sense, and is supported by the overwhelming weight of
authority, as will be apparent upon
consulting the large number of cases cited
in the notes to the above authorities, there
are two or three states, and among them
Illinois, where this rule has been departed
from. The early Illinois case of Aurora
Branch Railroad Co. v. Grines, 13 Ill.
585, was in accord with the general rule;
but by the case of Galena, 4-c., Railroad
Co. v. .Jacobs, 20 Ill. 478, and a long
series of subsequent cases, the rule in
that state is firmly settled as follows :
" The degrees of negligence (of the
plaintiff and defendant) must be measured and considered ; and wherever it
shall appear that the plaintiff's negligence is comparatively slight, and that
of the defendant gross, he shall not be
See the subsedeprived of his action."
quent cases collated, and the rule they
lay down, critieised in 2 Thomp. on Neg.
1168; Cooley on Torts 676; Shearm.
& Redf. on KNeg., sect. 37; 'Whart. on
Keg., sect. 334. A similar rule appears
to have been adopted in Kansas : Union
Pacific Railroad.,Co. v. Rollins, 5 Kans.
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167 ; Caulkins v. Mathews, Id. 191 ;
1146, 1165. By these cases the law in
Sawyer v. Sauer, 10 Id. 466; Kansas Georgia upon this important point does
not seem to be placed upon a basis either
Pactfic Railroad Co. v. Pointer, 14 Id.
37. As to the rule in Georgia, the case stable, as regards uniformity of decision,
of Augusta, 6c., Railroad Co. v. M£e- or satisfactory, as regards reason.
As'respects the decision in the princi.Elmurry, 24 Ga. 80, lays down substantially the same rule as prevails in Illinois
pal case upon the subject of contributory
and Kansas. See also, City of Rome v.
negligence, granting the premises the conDodd, 58 Geo. 238. The latest case clusion is logical and correct. We have
upon the subject in Georgia that has 'shown, however, that the rule adopted in
come to our notice is that of the Atlanta, Illinois is opposed by the great weight
4-c., Railroad Co. Tr. Wyley, 65 Ga. 121, of authority elsewhere. It seems, also,
to be equally opposed to sound principle,
where in an action against a railroad
if we adopt as correct the legal definicompany for injury to personal property
in charge of the plaintiff's agent, the tion of negligence given in the principal
case and the leading treatises upon negrule was laid down that if the accident
The rule, however, having
occurred wholly by the agent's fault, ligence.
there could be no recovery; if by the long been well settled" upon authority in
mixed fault of the agent and the com- ,that state, no other decision than that
rendered in the principal case could well
pany, there could be a recovery, but diminished in proportion to the agent's
have been arrived at, without overfault; if wholly by the fault or negli- turning a long line of precedents, a
gence of the company, then there could thing which it is rarely desirable to do.
be a recovery of fall damages, a rule The remedy in such a case, if one is
which seems to be a modification of the necessary, should be sought by legislarule in admiralty, but which seems to
tive action.
have been adopted by no other court of
MIARSHALL D. EwELL.
common law. See 2 Thomp. on Neg.
Chicago.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.
LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE RAILROAD CO. v. JANE E. WEAVER.
The receipt of goods by a common carridr directed to a place beyond the terminus
of the carrier's line, without any limitation of responsibility, is primafacieevidence
of. an undertaking to carry the goods to the place tb which they are directed, and
renders the carrier liable for their carriage to that point.
A carrier undertaking without any limitation of responsibility, to carry the baggage of a passenger, and giving a check therefor to a given point beyond the terminus of the carrier's line, becomes liable for the carriage of such baggage in the
same way, and to the same extent as the carrier of goods, although the passenger,
whose baggage is thus checked, may purchase and travel upon a coupon ticket.
Where, therefore, the defendant, a common carrier, sold to the plaintiff tickets
for herself and family for transportation by railroad from Memphis, Tenn., to San
Francisco, California, each ticket having separate coupons for each carrier over
whose road the route lay, and gave plaintiff a check for the carriage of her baggage
to Omaha, and a loss of baggage occurred before reaching Omaha, but after leaving
defendant's own road, the defendant was held liable for the loss.
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The plaintiff at San Francisco applied to the railroad companies whose roads lay
beyond Omaha for compensation for the loss, and those companies while denying
all liability made a deduction upon the price of the plaintiffs return tickets over
their roads, in consideration of her release of all claim against them for the alleged
loss. field, that neither the payment nor the release affected the liability of the
defendant.

ACTION by Jane E. Weaver against the Louisville and Nashville
Railroad to recover compensation for loss of baggage. The cause
was tried without a jury, by the judge of the Circuit Court, who
found the following facts.
The plaintiff purchased from the agent of the defendant at
Memphis through coupon tickets for herself and family from Memphis, Tenn. via Milan, St. Louis and Omaha, to San Francisco,
California, and started on the trip May 29th 1877. Her baggage was checked by defendant's agents at Memphis from that
city to Omaha and this baggage was delivered in good order, on
the same day, by the defendant to the next connecting road at
Milan.
The loss sued for subsequently occurred before the
plaintiff with her baggage reached Omaha.
The judge further found that the plaintiff, upon discovering her
loss after she arrived at San Francisco, applied to the Union and
Oentral Pacific Railroad Companies for compensation for the loss ;
that the companies denied any liability, but, upon the return trip
of the plaintiff in November, allowed her a deduction of between
one and two hundred dollars on the cost of transportation over their
roads to Omaha in consideration of her release of all claim against
the said Union and Central Pacific Railroad Companies for the
alleged loss, and that the plaintiff agreed in writing to these
terms.
The tickets issued by the defendant to the plaintiff contained a
separate coupon for each railroad company over whose road she
would pass en route, the defendants road only extending from Memphis to Milan. Each coupon contained a memorandum that it was
issued by the defendant, the name of the railroad company owning
that part of the line, and the names of the places at which that
part of the line commenced and ended. The coupons did not purport on their face to be issued by the several companies, nor were
they signed with any name. The only signature was that of the
general ticket agent at the end of the last coupon. The cheek
given for the baggage was the usual metal check.
Vo.. XIM I.-17
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The trial judge entered judgment for 'the plaintiff for the full
amount claimed. Defendant appealed.,
.Estes .Ellett, for plaintiff in error,.
Morgan

JcFarland,for defendant in error.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
C66PER J.-It is well settled that a railroad company, as a common carrier, may contract to carry to a point beyond the terminus
ok"its own line'so as to become liable for the delivery at that point,
and that the liability thus attaching at the commencement will
continue throughout the whole transit, all connecting lines of carriers employed in furthering and completing such transportation
becoming its agents, for whose defaults it is responsible: Railroad
v. Stockard, 11 Heisk. 568; Hutch. on Carriers, sect. 145. But
the courts are not in accord as to what will, primafacie, constitute
such a Contract.
In England the courts from the first adopted the rule; to which
they have firmly! adhered, that where a railroad company, as a
common carrier, receives goods directed to a place beyond the terminus of its own line, without limiting its responsibility by express
agreement, such receipt of the goods, so directed, is prima facie
evidence of an undertaking to carry the goods to the place to which
they are directed, and all connecting railroad companies or other
carriers along the route are merely the agents of the first company.
The latter is alone subject to suit for any loss or damage to the
goods, the other companies not being responsible to the owner for
want of privity of contract: 3Iluschamp v. ]?ailwajy Co., 8 M. &
W. 421. The same rule has been applied to a through contract
for the carriage of a passenger and his baggage: Hyttcn v. Railway, 4 H. & N. 615. The rule, founded as it is on common-law
principles, has much to recommend it by reason of its uniformity
and simplicity, and has been found to work well for the comparatively short distances of carriage in the British island. It has been
followed by the courts of a number of states in this country, but
modified generally so as to give an action against the carrying company actually guilty of the wrong out of which the cause of action
arises, although not the original contracting company. All of the
American courts, perhaps, except it may be of Georgia, concur in
adopting the English rule, with the modification suggested, wher-
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ever the' contract is clearly a through contract, or the circumstances
show that the contracting company has an interest, as partner or
otherwise, in the entire route: Hutch. on Carriers, sect. 160. The
courts of the States of Georgia seem to have adopted the English
rule without qualification. Many of the state courts have been led
to modify the rule not only in allowing the actually defaulting carrier, other than the first, to be sued, but in the matter of the prima
facie evidence of a. through contract and the burden of proof.
The reason of the latter modification may, probably, be found in the
greater distances of carriage in this country and the larger number of connecting lines. Another cause for the change of the
burden of proof may also be found in the form of through ticket,
known as the coupon ticket, used by our roads.
The question has been before this court on several occasions.
In the earliest of the cases, the suit was brought by a passenger
against the first carrier for the failure of the second carrier to
comply with the contract. The defendants sold to the plaintiff a
through ticket from Nashville to Memphis. The defendants were
the proprietors of a stage line for the first part of the route. Another company owned the residue of the stage line to the point
where it connected with the Memphis and Charleston Railroad,
which ran thence to Memphis. By an arrangement between these
three parties, it was agreed that passengers might pay the whole
fare at either end of the line, and receive a through ticket. There
was no proof to show that the plaintiff knew the arrangement
between the carriers. " We think," says HARRIS J., who delivers
the opinion of the court, "that when the defendants received the
plaintiff's money and gave him a through ticket, they thereby
became bound for his transportation on the entire, line, and that he
was entitled to a strict performance by the defendants of their
undertaking, or to recover compensation in damages for any breach
thereof. The arrangement between the defendants and the proprietors of other portions of the line was a matter with which the
plaintiff had nothing to do. He was no party to that agreement,
nor was he bound to look to any person for the performance of the
defendants' undertaking but themselves. If either party was guilty
of a breach, that was a matter for adjustment between themselves.
By the arrangement, the proprietors at each end of the line were
authorized to receive the fare and give through tickets to.show that
they had undertaken and received pay for the transportation of the
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passenger over the entire line, and the proprietors of the other portions of the line were their agents whom they trusted to perform that
part of the contract which lay on the portions of the line owned
by them. If this view of the subject be correct, and we think it
is, then it was wholly immaterial whether the plaintiff knew of this
arrangement or not. If the defendants, when they sold plaintiff the ticket, intended that he should risk the proprietors of the
other portions of the line to carry him through, then they should
have so stipulated, and informed him frankly of this arrangement,
so that he might, with full knowledge of the facts, have elected
whether he would pay the entire fare and take through tickets, or
pay them only for that portion of the line of which they were the
proprietors, and make his own arrangements for the balance of
the journey. They assumed, however, to carry him through, and
are responsible for the undertaking :" Carter v. Peck, 4 Sneed
203.
In the case of the East Tenn. and Va. Railroad Co. v. Nelson,
1 Cold. 276, the suit was for the failure on the part of the railroad company to transport wheat, shipped to New York, in due
time, under a special contract. "If," say the court, "the carrier,
or his servant within the scope of his employment, enter into any
special contract to deliver in any particular time and place, even
beyond the terminus of his particular route, it will be binding."
In the case of the Edst Tenn. and V'a. Railroad (Co. v. Rogers,
6 1Reisk.' 143, the plaintiff shipped freight at Chattanooga to
Atlanta, Georgia, taking a receipt fi'om the defendant of the delivery of the articles "to be forwarded" by the East Tennessee, and
Georgia railroad, subject to freight and the regulations of the company. The articles, consisting of provisions, were spoiled and
rendered valueless by the negligent detention of the agents of a
connecting road. 'A recovery against the first company was sustained. Judge FREmEIAN, who delivers the opinion of the court,
notices the co-nflict between the English and American rulings, and
cites the previous decisions of this court. "These cases," he says,
follow the principles of the English decisions, and we think lay
down the sounder doctrine on the subject." The rule adopted is
that a carrier, by simply taking charge of goods delivered to him
for carriage,' marked and destined to a particular place beyond the
terminus of his own road, without an express limitation of his
responsibility, and a'fortioriif he undertakes in terms to deliver
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which is the meaning of the words "to be forwarded," is bound to
deliver at the place in due time. "It would," adds the judge,
'-seriously incommode the business of the country if, when property is shipped by one road and must pass bver more than this road
in order to reach its destination, the shipper, in case of injury to
his goods, is to inquire how many routes, and how many different
companies make up the line between the place of shipment and
delivery, or to determine at his peril which company is liable for
the injury."
In the subsequent case, at the same term, of the Western .and
Atlantic Railroad Oo. v. Mc.lwee, 6 Heisk. 208, the charge of
the trial judge in accordance with the rulings in the previous cases
was sustained.

Judge

FRErE-AN,

who delivers the opinion of the

court, again reviews the conflicting decisions, and, after expressing
the opinion that the tendency of the later American rulings is in
favor of the English rule, adds that the case of c0arter v. Peck
"is, an emphatic endorsement of the English rule, and is the
proper one in all such cases."
The next case in our reports raised the qtestion of the liability
of an intermediate carrier to deliver goods promptly to the next
carrier. The goods had been shipped at Philadelphia on the Pennsylvania Central Railroad directed to Linton, Kentucky, under a
contract which limited the liability of the Pennsylvania company
to the terminus of its road, and thie proof indicated that the liability of the delinquent road, the Louisville and Nashville Railroad,
was to be governed by the same contract." Judge McFARLA.ND,
who delivers the opinion of the court, refers to the two preceding
cases as then recently decided, and as holding, " that where there
are two connecting lines of railway, and one road receives goods
for transportation, marked and consigned to a point beyond the
terminus of its own road, but on the line of the connecting road,
the road first receiving the goods will be held liable for their delivery at their destination, unless this liability is limited by express
contract." "These cases," he adds, "somewhat change the rule.
followed by perhaps a majority of the American cases, and follow
the English rule. Louisville and .NaslvilleRailroad Co. v. C'amp bell, 7 Heisk. 253.
Shortly afterwards, this court heard and disposed of the case of
of Purstenlhein v. Memphis and Ohio Railroad Company, 9 Heisk.
238. The plaintiff bought from the Pennsylvania Railroad con-
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pany in New York a through coupon ticket from New York to
Memphis. He received metallic checks for his baggage calling for
Memphis. His coupon ticket was recognised and the coupons taken
up by the railroad companies along the route. The proof tended
to show that the breaking into the baggage and loss of contents, for
which the suit was brought, occurred on the Pennsylvania road.
The suit was against the last carrier. NicHOLS0, C. J., in delivering the opinion of the court, undertakes to discuss the legal
import and extent of the contract between the plaintiff and the Pennsylvania Company, concluding thus: "All we have before us is the
simple fact that the Pennsylvania Central Company sold plaintiff
tickets which were recognised as good along the whole line, and
which carried him to Memphis. Without other fasts and circumstances proven, we are bound to hold that the Pennsylvania Central
Company undertook for itself to transport plaintiff and his baggage.
to Memphis, and that, as there is no privity shown between plaintiff and the defendants, the latter cannot be held responsibfe for
a loss shown to have occurred before the baggage reached their
road." This conclusion, it will be observed, is also in accord with
the English rule, in so far as it requires privity of contract to
sustain an action against any of the carriers other than the one- in
default.
Afterwards, the direct question of the liability of an intermediate carrier of freight for his own default was raised. A lot of
fruit trees was shipped in North Carolina, directed to the plaintiff
at Jackson, Tennessee, which the defendant, the Memphis and
Charleston Railroad Company, received from a preceding carrier,
and failed to deliver to the succeeding carrier because the latter
refused to pay the accrued freights. The trial judge instructed
the jury that if the defendant received the packages, directed to
the plaintiff at Jackson, Tenn., without any special contract limiting their undertaking, the law imposed upon the company the
obligation to deliver the goods at their destination, and they would
not be excused by the facts relied on. "This," says Judge McFARLAND, delivering the opinion of the court, ' is in accordance
with the cases recently decided by the court of Testern and Atlantic Railroad Co. v. .Me ,Elwee & Go. In these cases the question
was fully discussed, and need not be again examined." Railroad
v. Stockard, 11 Helisk. 568.
The question again came before the court at the April term, 1877,
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at this place. Goods were shipped at Cincinnati, packed in boxes
or cases, directed to the plaintiffs at Somerville, Tenn., and delivered
to the Louisville, Cincinnati and Lexington Railroad Company.
This company gave a receipt, specifying that the goods were to be
transported and delivered to the Louisville and Nashville Railroad
Company at Louisville, subject to certain conditions noted. One
of the conditions was that the liability of the company should terminate upon the delivery of the goods to the next line of transportation. The defendant was the last carrier in the line. The boxes
were delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff, who, upon opening
them, discovered that some of the goods were missing. It was
admitted "that the goods were lost somewhere between Cincinnati
and Somerville, but where is not known." It was argued, upon
the authority of Purstenheim's Case, that the action could not be
maintained because there was no privity of contract between plaintiffs and defendant. But it was held that the reason only applied
where the loss sued for occurred upon the line of the company with
whom the contract was made, and that there was no intimation in
i urstenheim's Case that an action might not have been maintained
against the last company for its own default. And it was expressly
held that -ipon the delivery of the goods to the defendant, it became
liable for them as a common carrier, subject at most only to the
limitations stipulated for on its behalf by the first company. The
judgment against the defendant was sustained upon the ground that
the defendant admitted the receipt of the goods without objection,
and that it was impossible for the plaintiffs to show where the loss
occurred.

"Upon grounds of public policy," says McFARLAND, J.,

in delivering the opinion, "it is better to put upon the carrier the
duty of tracing up the loss, and fixing it upon the party first liable,
Ml. and 0. Railroad Co. v.
than to put the duty on the owner."
Holloway, 9 Baxt. 188.
All of the foregoing cases recognise the English rule upon the
receipt of freight by a carrier directed to a point beyond its terminus, without any limitation upon its liability, but modify it, in
accordance with the great weight of American authority, so as to
sustain an action against any carrier on the line for its own default.
And by the last case it is determined that any carrier in the line is
in default, and may be sued for a loss, where the carrier has
received the packages or boxes containing the goods without objection. The case of Carter v. Peck, the only one which relates to
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the personal rights of a passenger, and Furstenheim'sCase, the only
one relating to the baggage of a passenger, both follow the English
rule. A through ticket, without more, would prima facie render
the first carrier liable upon the contract for the default of the other
carriers in the line of transportation in the case of passengers and
their baggage, as in the case of the shipment of goods. A through
contract as to the passenger will be a through contract as to his
baggage, in the absence of a different arrangement. But, as in the
case of goods, although the first carrier may contract and be responsible for the entire transportation, any subsequent and auxiliary
carrier to whose fault it can be traced will be liable to the owner
for the loss of his baggage: Hutch. on Car. sect. 715. The courts
of several of the states concur in holding the first company liable
for the loss of baggage in the case of a through ticket. illinois
Cent. Railroad Co. v. Jopeland, 24 Ill. 332; 0andee v. Penn.
Railroad Go., 21 Wis. 582; Wilson v. Railroad, 21 Grat. 654;
Burnell v. IM Y. Cent. Railroad Co., 45 iN. Y. 184. But the
check for the baggage may be given by one company for part of
the line when the passenger has a through ticket from another company, in which case the former will be liable for the loss. 1fe~ormicic v. Hudson. River Railroad Co., 4 E. D. Smith 1181 ; Straiton v. N. Y. and N -. Railroad Co., 2 Id. 184. So, no
doubt, the check nay, as in the case before us, be issued with the
through ticket but for only part of the way. In such a case, the
check may be considered as standing in the place of a bill of lading
for the distance called for, and imposes the duty to carry and
deliver accordingly. Dill v. S. '. Railway Co., 7 Rich. 158;
Wilon v. Chesapeake Railroad Co., 21 Gratt. 654.
It is conceded by the learned counsel of the plaintiffs in error in
the case before us that, by our decisions as given above, the whole
liability in regard to passengers, baggage and freight, is thrown
upon the company issuing the ticket or bill of lading, except where
an express stipulation to the contrary is shown. But he insists
that the rule is changed by Holloway's Case, 9 Baxt. 188, and
Sprayberry's Case, 8 Heisk. 852; s. c. 8 Baxt. 341. But Holloway's Case, as, we have seen, only extends the modification of the
English rule, by which the American courts allow an action against
the actual defaulting carrier in addition to the first carrier, so as to
give the action against any of the carrying companies shown to have
received the goods without objection, where it is impossible for the
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plaintiff to show in what part of the route the loss occurred. And
in SpraIberry's Case, the court, while exonerating the first carrier
from liability for the loss of life of a passenger by the negligence
of another carrier on the line under the circumstances, decided
nothing in regard to the liability for the loss of baggage, remarking that there were authorities holding that a different rule applied
to passengers from the rule applicable to freight and baggage : N1rashville J. Chat. Railroad Co. v. Sprayberry, 9 Heisk. 857. In that
case, Sprayberry purchased from an agent of the Nashville and
Chattanooga Railroad Company, at Chattanooga, tickets for himself,
wife and two children, from that place to Shreveport, Louisiana.
The tickets were coupon tickets, and indicated the route to be by
the Nashville and Chattanooga road to Nashville, and by other
connecting roads to Memphis, and from that point to Shreveport
by steamboat. While en route on the Mississippi river, and in the
state of Mississippi an accident occurred by which the wife and
children were drowned. It appeared in proof, that the different
lines of road were separate and distinct, owned and controlled by
different companies, with different agents and officers, and that
there was no contract or privity between them in regard to carrying passengers except the arrangement to sell through tickets.
Under these circumstances, the court held that the first company
was not liable to the husband for the damages given to him by a
statute of the state of Mississippi for the loss of his wife and children through the fault of the steamboat company. " We are of
opinion," says the court, "that in such cases the company selling
the ticket shall be regarded as the agent of the other lines, when the
tiekets themselves import this, and nothing else appears."
The form of the tickets is not given, but the language of the
opinion fairly implies that they showed upon their face the agency
of the issuing company, which might be either in words or by each
coupon purporting to be the ticket of the company over whose connecting line it was to be used. Such was the form of the ticket in
Milnor v. -ANew 1Haven Railroad co., 53 N. Y. 363. The plaintiff bought from the defendant a ticket of two coupons to Sheffield,
and received a through check for his trunk. Each coupon purported
to be the ticket of one of the two companies over whose roads the
passenger was to travel, containing the name of the company, and
being signed by different officers. In such a case, each coupon
m'ly well be treated as the separate ticket of a company issued by
VOL. XXXI.-18
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the selling company 'as its agent. In the case before us, the ticket.
it will be remembered, is in form the ticket of the defendant, the
coupons 'only designating the company over whose road the particular coupon-was to be used, and the termini of the route. If,
as suggested by the learned counsel of the plaintiff in error, the
presumption of law for or against the first company arises from the
form of the ticket i we cannot say that the form adopted, although
with coupons, shows it to be anything more than the ticket of th
issuing company. It is substantially like th6 ticket, with three
coupons for three iseveral companies, in Eart v. Rensselaer, and
Baratoqa Railroad (o.; 8 _N, Y. 37, where the baggage of the
passenger was checked through, and the defendant held liable for
its loss as the company issuing the ticket and receiving the baggage,
althoughowning the last road on the route.
The weight of American authority undoubtedly is that one carrier may sell to a passenger its own ticket, and at the same time
the tickets of connecting lines, entitling the passenger to through
transportation over all the lines, and may receive the fare for the
whole distance, without becoming responsible for the carriage of the
pasgenger beyond its line. The tickets for the several lines are in
such cases known as coupon tickets, and each ticket, apparently
without reference to the form, being considered as the separate contract of the carrier over whose route it entitles the holder to be
carried. ' The presumption is that the carrier who sells the tickets,
nothing else appearing, sells them as the agent of the other lines,
and the coupons are regarded and treated as the contracts of the
respective carriers, precisely as if they had been sold by the carriers
themselves instead of by the common agent: Hutch. on Carriers,
sect. 152, and note. Even in this view, it would not follow that
the liability of the carriers for the passenger's baggage would be
the same, or governed by the same rule as the liability for the passenger. The reason is obvious. There can never be. any doubt as
to the!carrier by whose fault the passenger is'injured, or the personal contract with him violated. While on the other hand, there
'may bpethe same difficulty, in ascertaining the carrier at fault in
regard to baggage as in the case of ordinary freight. We are of
opinion, therefore, that the carrier contracting to carry the baggage
of a passenger by checking it to a given point becomes liable by the
contract for its safe carriage, in the same way and to the same extent
as the carrier of goods. The check is in legal effect a bill of lading
for the baggage.

